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for the purpose of preventing a removal to the federal court.0 His peti-
tion must allege that the joinder was fraudulent,7 and the allegations must
be proven.8 A fraudulent joinder exists where the petitioning defendant
has alleged and proven that plaintiff's allegations are unfounded and incap-
able of proof and were not made with the intent to prove them,0 or by show-
ing that plaintiff has no desire to prosecute the suit against the resident
defendant to a judgment.10 However, proof of the insolvency of the resi-
dent defendant will not make the joinder fraudulent."
If there is no question that under the state law the plaintiff has a jointi
cause of action, then his motive in joining the defendants is immaterial.12
Even if the joinder was improper under the state law, a removal will not
be granted if the joinder was made in good faith.' 3 Good faith means that
the plaintiff thought that under the facts of his case he had a joint cause
of action.
14
The principal case follows the general rule and is illustrative of some
of the foregoing principles.
S. K.
REwARDs-SnERIFF'S RIGHT TO COLLEcT-CoNSIDERATION-[Kentucky].
It is undoubted law that an act of a public officer which is required by legal
duty cannot be sufficient consideration for a contractual promise to pay a
reward for the performance of the act.' But this principle is being re-
stricted by technical definitions of duty. The result is that an officer is per-
mitted to enforce a contract of reward, if he can show that he has done an
act outside the strict line of his duty. A recent Kentucky case, Kentucky
Bankers' Association et al. v. Cassady et al.,2 shows that this trend is recog-
nized in that state. The Pewee Valley State Bank was robbed, and the Ken-
tucky Bankers' Association, of which the Pewee Valley State Bank was a
6. Dobie, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (1928) 408; Breymann et al.
v. Pa. etc. Ry. Co., 38 F. (2d) 209 (C. C. A. 6, 1930).
7. Thomas v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 147 Fed. 83 (C. C. A. 9, 1906).
8. Plymouth Gold Mining Co. v. Amador & Sacramento Canal Co., 118
U. S. 264 (1885).
9. Warax v. Cincinnati etc. Ry. Co., 72 Fed. 637 (C. C., D. Ky., 1896).
10. Dishon v. Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co., 133 Fed. 471 (C. C. A. 6, 1904)
(resident defendant not served with summons).
11. Deere, Wells & Co. v. Chicago Ry. Co., 85 Fed. 876 (C. C., S. D.
Iowa, 1898).
12. Ibid; see Chicago Ry. Co. v. Schwyhart, 227 U. S. 184, 194, 33 S. Ct.
250, 57 L. ed. 473 (1912).
13. See Alabama Southern Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U. S. 206, 218, 26
S. Ct. 161, 50 L. ed. 441 (1905).
14. Comment, 100 Cent. L. J. 99 (1927).
1. Restatement, Contr-acts (1932) sec. 76a; Kick v. Merry, 23 Mo. 72, 66
Am. Dec. 658 (1856); Somerset Bank v. Edmund, 76 Ohio St. 396, 81 N. E.
641, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1170 (1907); Mechem, Public Offices and Officers
(1890) sec. 885.
2. Kentucky Bankers Association v. Cassady, 94 S. W. (2) 622 (Ky.,
1936).
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member, offered a reward for the arrest and conviction of the robbers. The
plaintiff, a private citizen at the time of the robbery, had been sheriff of
Oldham County before the robbery, and was elected to the same office three
years after the robbery. He learned that a bank had been robbed in Indiana,
and the guilty persons sent to prison. While sheriff for the second time,
the plaintiff obtained pictures of these men, and one of them, named Wines,
through the pictures was identified by the officers of the Pewee Valley Bank
as the robber of their bank. When Wines was about to be paroled from
prison in Indiana, the plaintiff, having been notified by the warden of the
prison of the date of the release, obtained a Kentucky requisition, went over
to Indiana, and arrested Wines. Wines was convicted of the Kentucky
felony and was sentenced to the reformatory. The sheriff sued for the
reward offered by the defendant, who pleaded that there was want of con-
sideration. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the reward
offered, on the ground that a public officer with the authority of law to
make an arrest may accept an offer of a reward for acts or services per-
formed outside of his bailiwick or not within the scope of his official duties.
3
The court found that the plaintiff had done more than his duty, when he
made investigations before his election, when he obtained the requisition,
when he made the trip to the state of Indiana, and when he executed the
requisition at the gate of the prison. There was no statute, the court de-
clared, imposing a duty on a sheriff to obtain a requisition and to execute
it outside the state.
In other courts it has been held that a sheriff may obtain a reward for
searching outside his jurisdiction for a fugitive and going in search of the
fugitive;4 for arresting prisoners, who had escaped from an adjoining
county, in the sheriff's own county but without process;5 for arresting a
suspected felon without warrant in a county other than the county of the
arresting sheriff; 6 for investigating and having criminals arrested, where
the sheriff is a "non pay" or "special" sheriff;7 for following criminals and
causing their arrest in the state to which they had fled; 8 for investigating
and collecting evidence of a crime committed outside of the sheriff's county. 9
A Missouri Appellate court has decided in Davis v. MillsaP o0 that where
a sheriff in reliance upon an offer of a reward searches for a criminal who
has escaped from his county, and captures him in another county or fol-
3. Mechem, Public Offices and Officers (1890) sec. 885; Marsh v. Wells-
Fargo & Co. Express, 88 Kan. 538, 129 Pac. 168, 43 L. Rt. A. (N. S.) 133
(1913); Davis v. Millsap, 159 Mo. App. 167, 140 S. W. 751 (1911).
4. Brown v. Godfrey, 33 Vt. 120 (1860).
5. Davis v. Munson, 43 Vt. 676, 5 Am. Rep. 315 (1870).
6. Marsh v. Wells-Fargo & Co. Express, 88 Kan. 538, 129 Pac. 168, 43
L. R. A. (N. S.) 133 (1913).
7. Elkins v. Board of County Commissioners of Wyandotte County, 91
Kan. 518, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 638, 138 Pac. 578 (1914); Smith v. Penner,
102 Kan. 830, 172 Pac. 514, L. R. A. 1918 E. (1918) ; Hartley v. Inhabitants
of Granville, 216 Mass. 38, 102 N. E. 942, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 622 (1913).
8. Chambers v. Ogle, 117 Ark. 242, 174 S. W. 532, (1915).
9. Harris v. More, 70 Cal. 502, 11 Pac. 780 (1886).
10. Davis v. Millsap, 159 Mo. App. 167, 140 S. W. 751, (1911).
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lows a fugitive from justice and apprehends him in another state, he is
entitled to the reward. This Missouri case was cited in the Kentucky case,
Kentucky Bankers' Association v. Cassady. It is established in Missouri
that rewards offered may be recovered by sheriffs for doing what is just
outside the strict limits of their official duties.11
By strictly contruing the duties of sheriffs, the courts enable ther to
recover rewards and extra fees for doing little more than their duties. Thus
the acts of a sheriff outside the strict limits of his official duties are suffi-
cient consideration to enforce a contract of reward or a contract for extra
compensation.
A. T. S.
TAXATION-FEDER.AL ExcisE TAXES--INJUNCTIVE RELIEF-[FEDERAL]*.-
Plaintiff, a soap company, seeks to enjoin a Collector of Internal Revenue
from collecting the tax imposed on the first domestic processing of coconut
oil and palm oil by Section 6 02 1/2 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1934,1 on the
alleged ground that the section is unconstitutional. Held: The allegation
and showing of "ultimate financial ruin resulting from the continued pay-
ment of the tax" was not sufficient to prevent the application of Section
3224 of the Revised Statutes of the United States2 which prohibits the main-
tenance of suits to restrain the collection of taxes. Huston, etc., V. Iowa
Soap Co.3
Historically courts of equity have .been reluctant to grant an injunction
against the levy, assessment, or collection of a tax, since such action would
interfere with governmental activities. 4 Where, however, a well recognized
ground for equitable jurisdiction was present, equity did not hesitate to e*-
ercise its natural jurisdiction even in tax litigation.
In 1867 Congress passed an act which, in language at least, prohibited
suits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.0
There followed a period in which decisions of the Supreme Court, interpret-
ing that section, announced the retention of the court's equitable jurisdic-
11. Smith v. Vernon County, 188 Mo. 501, 87 S. W. 949, 70 L. R. A. 59,
107 Am. St. Rep. 324 (1905); Cornwell v. St. Louis Transit Co., 100 Mo.
App. 258, 73 S. W. 305 (1903).
* For a general survey of the question, see: Note, 21 ST. LOUIS LAW
REVIEW 140 (1936); Note, 18 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW 311 (1933);
Miller, Restraining the Collection of Federal Taxes (1923) 71 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 318.
1. 48 Stat. 602% (a), 26 U. S. C. A. see. 999 (a).
2. 14 Stat. 475, 26 U. S. C. A. see. 1543 (1867).
3. 4 U. S. Law Week 85 (C. C. A. 8, 1936).
4. 4 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed. 1924) sec. 1640 et seq.; 4 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence (3d ed.) sec. 1779; 1 High, Injunctions (4th ed. 1905) sec.
485.
5. Dows v. Chicago, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 108, 110, 20 L. ed. 65 (1870) ; State
R. R. Tax Case 92 U. S. 575, 614, 23 L. ed. 663 (1875).
6. Supra, note 2.
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